Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni
Formerly of Department of History & Development Studies
Midlands State University Gweru

Introduction
This article examines civil-military relations in Matabeleland in the period 1980 to 2002 from a historical perspective and is largely based on oral testimonies collected from the Ndebele themselves.

Brief Military History of Matebeleland Region Prior to 1980

One of the important issues to note about the history of the Ndebele in general is that it has been subjected to mythology. The myth of the Ndebele is that they were portrayed as a militaristic offshoot of the equally militaristic and brutal Zulu kingdom under king Shaka. The Ndebele are said to have survived by military plunder, pillage and violent raids that affected their neighbours adversely. The Shona of the Zimbabwean plateau are said to have been the targets of Ndebele raids in the nineteenth century. This mythology while containing some truth had far-reaching implications for the Ndebele. As a result of this myth, the imperialists approached the Ndebele wielding both the “stick and diplomacy”, leading to the various fraudulent and bogus treaties, concessions, the violent wars of conquest in 1893 and 1896, as well as the Matopos Indabas . The mythology, which the Ndebele accepted as truth for hegemonic reasons and to boost their image, has led to “unholy” relations between the Ndebele and the Shona as the two major ethnic groups in the country, with far-reaching implications for the post-colonial political developments, particularly the military violence perpetrated by the largely Shona speaking Fifth Brigade in Matebeleland in the early 1980s.

The second important aspect to note is that the Ndebele state in the nineteenth century provided a unique case of cordial civil-military relations. The age-set groups, which were erroneously characterized as regiments by early historians, from which the military forces were derived, were not just an institution of state dictatorship and violence, rather were units of production. There was a superb blending of military attributes and economic or productive imperatives in the Ndebele state. As a productive unit, the age-set groups remained subservient to the civilian society making substantial contribution to the welfare of the civil society. After performing military duties or assignments, the Ndebele forces were readily absorbed by the mainstream civil society where they originated. They performed such important civil and community services as building homes, herding cattle, as well as cultivation of crops.

If the Ndebele military forces were ever violent and brutal, this was in connection with the external operations and against foreign foes. At home, they were largely a unit of production and assumed full civilian attributes serve for carrying out policing duties, which were necessary for the smooth functioning of the state. This organization of Ndebele military forces engendered cordial civil-military relations as the military emerged directly from the mainstream civil society and returned to it after the military assignment. The cordial civil-military relations, were further enhanced by the fact that war booty, particularly cattle, were distributed by the inkosi (king) to the provinces (izigaba) for the benefit of the Ndebele society at large.

The third important issue to note about the history of the Ndebele relates to the dominance of “violence” and “memory”. The violence was perpetrated by various militaries dating back to the pre-colonial times. This theme is superbly captured in Jocelyn Alexander, Joan McGregor and Terence Ranger’s recent and classic book, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the “Dark Forests” of Matebeleland, where they state that “violence has so powerfully shaped the history and the memory of the past in Matebeleland.” It must be added that the notion of violence also affected the Ndebele and Matebeleland region’s perception of civil-military relations. This notion of violence and memory is derived from the experiences of the Ndebele such as the Mfecane wars of the 1820s and 1830s, the imperialist wars of conquest (1893 and 1896), the severe history of forced evictions and coercive agrarian interventions of the settler colonial state, the nationalist resistance and intense colonial repression of the 1960s, the violence of the liberation war of the 1970s, and finally the devastating post-colonial violence of the 1980s.

As such the dynamics of Matebeleland region’s perception of civil-military relations must be located in this rather hidden political history of the region, which lies active at local level but at national level is submerged beneath the master-narrative of official Zimbabwean nationalism that celebrates the successes of the ruling ZANUPF party and its guerrilla army, ZANLA, while at the sometime pandering to pan–ethnic nationalism.

Liberation War Time Civil-Military Relations: The Case of the ZIPRA and Matebeleland Region

While studies of guerrilla-civilian relations during the struggle for Zimbabwe are among the most sophisticated and detailed of their kind, most of them cover the areas of Mashonaland where the ZANLA operated and where ZANU dominated the political space. Matebeleland region where the Ndebele are dominant and where the ZIPRA mainly operated under the banner of ZAPU has remained outside the orbit of scholarly studies.

The major studies on guerrilla-civilian relations in Zimbabwe include, David Lan’s Guns and Rain, where he noted that the civilians were caught between two armed forces, that is, the ZANLA guerrillas and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) who were competing for the “hearts and minds” of the civilians. While Lan alluded to guerrilla violence against “sell-outs” and “witches”, he largely neglected the overall guerrilla coercion against the civilians who simply failed to comply with guerrilla instructions and demands. Lan presented the guerrilla-civilian relations in positive terms in the Dande area.

The other important book on guerrilla-civilian relations is Terence Ranger’s Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, where he presented a largely positive picture of guerrilla-civilian relations based on the case study of Makoni District where the ZANLA operated. In many parts of this well-written book, Ranger makes reference to the “fearsome military power” of the RSF as though the ZANLA guerrillas themselves did not act arbitrarily and without respect for the civilians. It was only in an article entitled “Bandits and Guerrillas: The Case of Zimbabwe”, that Ranger grappled directly with the issue of violent guerrilla-civilian relations. He confined this to the last years of the struggle for Zimbabwe, 1978-1979. Ranger attributed this violence of the guerrillas towards the rural peasants to the fact that the guerrillas were under intense pressure from the auxiliary forces of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and that the guerrillas were receiving less training than before.

Norma J. Kriger in her influential but controversial book, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices, which is confined to Mutoko District where the ZANLA forces operated, emphasized more than any other work the violence and coercive propensity of the guerrillas in their interaction with the civilians. Kriger’s book is one of the most important critical studies of guerrilla-civilian relations and it stands as one of the monumental critiques of the traditional popular peasant support for the guerrilla wars of liberation in Africa. What emerges from this study is that the guerrilla-civilian relations cannot be seen simplistically as characterized by mutual support and popular appeals of the liberation war and African nationalism. Popular appeals and support were punctuated, blended and laced with intimidation, force, violence and death. Even Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi’s recent detailed study entitled, For Better or Worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle, while concerned with gender issues also underlined the prominence of violence and coercion in guerrilla-civilian relations where the ZANLA operated.

What can be said with certainty is that the guerrilla-civilian relations during the struggle for Zimbabwe in areas where ZANLA operated were shaped by a number of factors, ranging from haphazard training, role of the mujibhas and chibwidos as a link between guerrillas and the mainstream civilian population, attempts by the civilians themselves to use the guerrillas to settle their own local vendettas, competitions, and differences as well as the issue of general indiscipline among the guerrillas. Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi added the problem of ideological antipathy in ZANLA’s rear base camps as another explanation for the “unholy” relations between the civilians in the front. The disturbing academic issue is that all these insights are derived from the studies of the liberation war in Mashonaland where the ZANLA forces were dominant and they cannot be said to be true for Matebeleland where a different guerrilla army dominated under the banner of ZAPU.

The point is that the ZIPRA-civilian relations have not received the same academic attention, as is the case with ZANLA-civilian relations. The main studies on ZIPRA operations and their relations with the civilians include, Joshua Nkomo’s Nkomo: The Story of My Life, Jocelyn Alexander, Joan McGregor and Terence Ranger’s Violence and Memory, Jeremy Brickhill’s chapter, “Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU, 1976-79”, in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger’s Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War and N. Bhebe’s award-winning and recent book, The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe. What emerges from these few studies on ZIPRA-civilian relations is that the ZIPRA did not need to draw on local sources of legitimacy such as spirit mediums like the ZANLA forces and that there was no need for using violence to establish themselves among the civilians. The ZIPRA’s task was to identify themselves as “Nkomo’s boys” and to interact with the civilians through the hidden but existing ZAPU party hierarchy.

In other words, the hidden rural ZAPU political structures were invigorated with the arrival of ZIPRA in Matebeleland and played an important role in mediating between the ZIPRA and the civilians. The ZIPRA-civilian relations were based on a moral economy of supply, trying to uphold norms of law and order, and widening the social basis of ZAPU membership and leadership. ZIPRA forces like their ZANLA counterparts, relied on civilians for food, cigarettes, clothes, boots, medicine and intelligence on the movement of enemy forces. However, unlike the ZANLA forces who were actively involved in the construction of ZANU party political structures and destroying the existing ZAPU ones and violently harassing those who had sympathies with ZAPU dating back to the pre-1963 split in ZAPU, the ZIPRA guerrillas modeled themselves as soldiers and left the politics to rural veteran ZAPU nationalists.

In many instances the ZIPRA guerrillas entered their operational areas with names of key rural ZAPU political leaders. This made them easily accepted by the people and as such the ZIPRA had no reason to rely heavily on violence and coercion so as to gain material and political support. Known local ZAPU representatives introduced the ZIPRA to the civilian mainstream rural population. This engendered cordial guerrilla-civilian relations in Matebeleland.

What is even more important to note is that despite the fact that the ZIPRA were highly trained and better armed, they remained subordinate to the veteran rural civilian ZAPU nationalists. Some of these rural veteran ZAPU nationalists were themselves ex-detainees who had recruited and assisted the guerrillas to cross to Zambia in the 1960s and 1970s. Sometimes the rural ZAPU nationalists patronized the ZIPRA guerrillas and debated their conduct, and the legitimacy of some of their actions, basing their views on the vast knowledge of the ZAPU constitution. This relationship helped to limit the levels of ZIPRA violence and promoted cordial guerrilla-civilian relations in Matebeleland.

However, the ZIPRA like the ZANLA sometimes involved themselves in brutal killing of “sell-outs” and “witches.” These guerrilla interventions in issues of selling-out and witchcraft within Matebeleland region provoked some of the most traumatic incidents of the liberation war and occasioned intense moral and political debate. The ZAPU local civilian leaders together with the ZIPRA command strove to control violence, particularly against witches precisely because it undermined support for the guerrillas. The local civilian ZAPU leaders and the guerrilla commanders debated the legitimacy of witchcraft accusations and the mandate of the ZIPRA’s authority to kill the witches under the broad terms of ZIPRA military strategy and ZAPU’s constitution.

The other issue that threatened the cordial relations between the ZIPRA and the civilians related to sexual relations between young girls and the guerrillas. When it became apparent that there were indeed widespread illicit sexual relations between the guerrillas and young girls, again the civilian rural ZAPU leadership intervened to remind the ZIPRA forces of their objective, which was that of liberating the people from the yoke of settler colonialism rather than sleeping with women. They met with resistance from both the young girls who had taken advantage of the war situation to exercise their sexuality outside the parental control, as well as from the ZIPRA guerrillas some of whom eventually married their wartime girl friends at independence. What was not common was the issue of rape, whereby the ZIPRA guerrillas forced young girls to have sex with them out of agreement.

As such Matebeleland civilian accounts of their relationship with the ZIPRA do not emphasize violence, coercion and death, instead the accounts highlight ZIPRA bravery, political commitment and cooperation. The civilian complaints about the conduct of ZIPRA towards them are very limited. Hence, in Matebeleland, the liberation war as prosecuted by the ZIPRA, notwithstanding its structural violence and strains, remains a source of pride and solidarity for the civilians as well as the combatants.

The ZIPRA are remembered for their courage and daring as well as in endearing terms such as obhudi (our dear brothers) by those who were youth during the struggle for Zimbabwe, as abafana (the boys) by the patronizing elderly men as well as abantwa bethu (our sons) by elderly women. All this indicated cordial civil-military relations in Matebeleland prior to 1980. This was soon to disappear with the achievement of independence and the victory of ZANUPF in the 1980 general elections. Matebeleland witnessed the forced demobilization of the loved ZIPRA combatants from the army, their demonization as dissidents and their harassment together with the civilians. The people of Matebeleland began to witness largely Shona speaking military forces, which were not kind but brutal towards them. The net effect of all this was to “demobilize” the Matebeleland region from the state and to engender the feeling of being “step sons and daughters” of the new Zimbabwean state on whom the “whip” rather than “love” characterized the relationship. Since the “whip” was always cranked by the military on the civilians, the civil-military relations were spoiled beyond repair in Matebeleland.
The Post-Colonial State of Zimbabwe and the Changing Civil-Military Relations in Matebeleland Region

At the conceptual level, Ibbo Mandaza in his book, Peace and Security in Southern Africa, tried to examine the general character of the post-colonial state in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular. According to Mandaza, the post-colonial state’s main features are that it is a hostage, weak, dependent and artificial creation. It is a product of authoritarian, divisive and racist colonialism, and it inherited unequal and uneven development derived from the exploitative and oppressive colonial situation. As such every new African leader who assumed the leadership of the post-colonial state after the departure of the colonialists had to grapple with the complex and delicate process of nation building, since the post-colonial state itself was a nation-state-in-the-making. This analysis reveals that the post-colonial state in general was fragile, based on very poor political, economic and social foundations. As such its first priority was its security and to be more precise, the security of those who assumed power.

The post-colonial state leadership faced the challenge of constructing a nation-state from people of diverse ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. It had the mammoth task of making the even hitherto enemies to co-exist and to identify with the new nation-in-the-making. The leaders themselves were elevated to the positions of power by playing the negative card of ethnic differences in some countries, making it difficult for them to achieve pan-ethnic solidarity as the basis of a united nation. The poignant issue, therefore, is that the post-colonial state by its very nature is prone to conflict, particularly intra-state conflict. As such it would be too ambitious to expect cordial civil-military relations in a state of fragility and insecurity, and where the security of the state itself rather than the people, was the priority.

The major problem of the post-colonial state is that it was largely incapable of undertaking the expected role of mediating between competing and contending forces within society. Secondly, it has failed to deliver the fruits of independence to the majority as well as the minority of its citizens. Its failure to resolve the various questions such as the land issue, pan-ethnic solidarity, acceptable power sharing formula, fair treatment of minorities and building of truly national armies reflective of ethnic diversities in the state, have led the post-colonial state to be intransigent and to utilize the coercive arsenal at its disposal, particularly the repressive machinery inherited from the highly repressive colonial state, against its own people. The main characteristic of the post-colonial state is the use of the military to silence dissenting voices.

Richard Webner in his book, Tears of the Dead: The Social Biography of an African Family, tried to put the conflict that engulfed Matebeleland and the Midlands in the 1980s in Zimbabwe and that created long lasting “unholy” relations between the military and the civilians in Matebeleland, within the context of what he termed “quasi-nationalism” . This “quasi-nationalism” was a product of failed nation building as well as new Zimbabwean flawed and narrow strategy of national construction under ZANUPF premised on assumption of absolute power and moral authority within a one-party state political and ideological framework. The catastrophe of “quasi-nationalism” as opposed to pan-ethnic nationalism is that it legitimized and authorized violence against all those that were perceived to be opposed to the new ZANUPF agenda. The Matebeleland region and the Ndebele as an ethnic group were soon seen as standing in the way of the process of nation building. Matebeleland and the Ndebele were soon identified as the “other” and purging of the “other” became necessary for the progress of nation building. The purging was legitimized on pre-colonial Shona-Ndebele antagonisms of the nineteenth century, past political vendettas between PFZAPU and ZANUPF, party ideological differences, as well as ethnic grounds. It was, therefore, no coincidence that the Fifth Brigade was also called Gukurahundi, which in Shona language means “the rain that washes away the chaff from the last harvest, before the spring rains.” It would seem the “last harvest” was the achievement of independence, the Matebeleland region and the Ndebele were the “chaff”, who were supposed to be washed away, and the “spring rains” were the establishment of the one-party state in Zimbabwe.

What emerges from the above analysis is that the political developments and the violence that took place in Zimbabwe in the 1980s cannot be seen separate from the failure of the post-colonial state under ZANUPF to undertake the expected role of peaceful meditation between competing and contending forces that fought for the independence of Zimbabwe. The post-colonial state failed to open up enough spaces for full incorporation and integration of all people of Zimbabwe regardless of ethnic and linguistic differences. The ruling elite, as a strategy of nation building, resorted to violence and abuse of the military, leading to the generation of negative civil-military relations.

It is, however, imperative to note that when independence was achieved in 1980, Robert Mugabe as the prime minister and ZANUPF as a ruling party, faced the mammoth task of trying to unite a country and people that had been subjected to ninety years of oppressive, divisive and racist rule. The country had also experienced a decade of escalating military activity, which had served not only to accelerate the process of liberating the country from settler colonialism, but also polarized the different human groups. It was, therefore, obvious that constructing a new nation and integrating a community that had serious divisions would be no easy task .

Robert Mugabe’s magnanimous and widely quoted speech at independence which encouraged every Zimbabwean to forget the past and heralded the official policy of reconciliation of all parties involved in the conflict that gave birth to Zimbabwe as well as the amnesty ordinances of 1979 and 1980, were all part and parcel of positive strategies of nation building. This nation building agenda was to go in tandem with the integration of the ZIPRA, ZANLA, and RSF into a true national army. However, these positive and peaceful moves towards nation building did not even survive beyond 1980, they were soon thrown to the shadows by negative legacies that worked against non-violent creation of a pan-ethnic nation.

These negative legacies included the external threat from apartheid South Africa which saw a new united Zimbabwe as a threat to its own survival, the ugly head of the historical antagonisms between the Ndebele and the Shona, the legacy of colonial rule, particularly the abuse of the military and unaccountability of the military, the legacy of mistrust between the two liberation armies of ZIPRA and ZANLA, politicization of ethnicity, dislike between the ZAPU and ZANU politicians dating back to the split of 1963 and the selfish agenda of ZANUPF to establish a one-party state. All these negative legacies worked together to create a conflict situation and opened wide the political space for the intervention of the military in civilian affairs with serious consequences for the civil-military relations. Mugabe and ZANUPF entered a path of “authoritarian nation building” based on the use of the military and violence.

The Building of a Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Alienation of Matebeleland Region

The building of the Zimbabwe National Army out of the erstwhile ZIPRA, ZANLA and RSF was code-named “Operation Sausage Machine” and was an important part of the wider process of nation building. As the process of state building in itself is always “messy”, protracted and bloody, the building of the national army in Zimbabwe became even worse and more “messy” with far reaching implications for the future civilian-military relations. A number of factors, including the negative legacies outlined in the preceding section militated against the creation of a truly national Zimbabwean army, representative of all the people. As a result of the assassination attempts on the life of the prime minister, Robert Mugabe largely associated with the former RSF and ex-ZIPRA combatants between 1980 and 1982, high level of mistrust emerged. The sporadic outbreaks of violence between ZIPRA and ZANLA in the assembly points (APS) as well as between both and the RSF further created animosities. The use of inflammatory political speeches by the ZANUPF politicians such as Enos Nkala as well as the prime minister himself did not assist the process of integrating the different military units into one national army. The discovery of arms caches in ZAPU owned properties broke the camel’s back as the government used it as a pretext to deploy a massive security clampdown on Matebeleland and began to apportion blame for the deteriorating security situation to ZAPU and ZIPRA.

A number of studies have concentrated on the dangers posed by the absence of a dedicated policy towards demilitarization, demobilization and civil integration at the expense of the more dangerous failure by the post-colonial Zimbabwean state to create a trusted national army out of the ZIPRA, ZANLA and RSF. This failure was typified by the government move between 1981 and 1982 to establish new “politically correct military units” parallel to the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) such as the Korean trained Presidential Guards, the Artillery Regiment, the notorious Fifth Brigade as well as the now defunct People’s Militia.

The defection of large numbers of ex-ZIPRA combatants and the forced demobilization of many others from the ZNA was also an indication of the failure to create a trusted national army in Zimbabwe. What was even more disastrous was the government response to the failed attempt to create a trusted national army. It engaged in apportioning the blame on the political unwillingness of ZAPU to build Zimbabwe and hatched the allegation of ZAPU and ZIPRA’s intention to topple the government of ZANUPF. Regime security obsession blinded the government to the real issues that caused the failure of the creation of the unified national army. The steps taken by the government included “witch-hunts” within the military forces and harassment of the ex-ZIPRA combatants as well as the deployment of the so-called “politically correct military units” in Matebeleland. The whole ZNA, it seems was no longer trusted and the internal security sector which in many democratic societies is the province of the ministry of home affairs and the police, was taken over by the ministry of defence and the military forces. This unfortunate development had far reaching implications for the civil-military relations in Matebeleland region.

Matebeleland Region under Military Siege

The widely publicized and exaggerated “dissident problem” that engulfed Matebeleland region in the early 1980s was a direct manifestation of the failure by the post-colonial state to create a unified and trusted national army as well as the product of an authoritarian nation building process based on ethnic favouratism and party political preferences. During the attempts to create a trusted national army, the ex-ZIPRA combatants began to complain of being sidelined, being harassed and threats to their lives. Some complained of being under serious pressure to demobilize themselves from the ZNA. Those who had demobilized themselves soon found themselves being harassed and threatened by the newly created Fifth Brigade. It was from this situation that the “dissident problem” emerged in the early 1980s. The harassment of Joshua Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders in the wake of the discovery of arms caches concretized the ex-ZIPRA conviction that they were under threat from the government . The deployment of the Fifth Brigade worsened the situation and added the ethnic element to the conflict. Between 1982 and 1987, Matebeleland fell under a military siege that was characterized by extreme violence and death.

What the government did not realize was that the politically motivated clampdown on ZAPU leadership and ZIPRA forces and the attempt to render them redundant in the post-colonial political dispensation, led to the general regional “demobilization” of Ndebele people from the state. The people of Matebeleland considered themselves as “orphans” in the face of the deployment of purely partisan and politically motivated Fifth Brigade.

The Fifth Brigade and Matebeleland Region

The deployment of the Fifth Brigade to Matebeleland in 1983 was a major blow to the existing civil-military relations in the region. The Fifth Brigade was an entirely Shona-speaking crank unit and the Ndebele-speaking people who were part of it were kept solely for instrumental purposes including familiarity with Matebeleland terrain and communication purposes. The Fifth Brigade was unlike any other unit of the ZNA. It was answerable directly to the prime minister and operated outside the normal military chain of command. It received North Korean training that was both military and political in content.

In Matebeleland, the Fifth Brigade was identified through the red-barrettes and their violence. The Brigade was specifically intended for what was termed “internal defence purposes,” meaning that it took over the duty of the police. As such the Fifth Brigade directly intervened in civil affairs of Matebeleland and carried out a grotesquely violent campaign from the date of its deployment in January 1983.

The Fifth Brigade unlike the other ZNA units openly justified its violence against civilians in Matebeleland in explicitly tribal and political terms. It even evoked pre-colonial memories of Ndebele raids on the Shona and modeled itself as purely Shona defence force that came to punish the Ndebele for their historical misdeeds. As such it targeted every Ndebele be it a child, woman, man, civil servant and, it was even more aggressive to ex-ZIPRA combatants and the ZAPU leaders in rural Matebeleland.

The operations of the Fifth Brigade were marked by establishment of bases at such places as district offices, missions, police stations, schools, boreholes as well as hidden mountains. These acted as detention, killing and torture centres. The most notorious one was Bhalagwe in Kezi where a lot of people were secretly killed. The Fifth Brigade also directed its energies to what can be termed ‘‘political re-orientation and mobilization.” This included forcing Ndebele people to attend ZANUPF meetings and the ZANLA-style pungwes. At these meetings the people of Matebeleland were forced to speak in Shona, to carry ZANUPF party cards, to sing ZANUPF songs in Shona, to chant ZANUPF slogans in Shona and to denounce Joshua Nkomo and the rest of the ZAPU leadership. The people were also forced to come and witness the brutal torture and killing of their loved ones and to ululate in support of the death of their sons and daughters.

The other feature of Fifth Brigade operations in Matebeleland included deprivation of food to the people through closure of stores, grinding mills, butcheries and burning of granaries. This was done under the blanket of curfew. Slaughter of whole families and burning down of homes were part and parcel of Fifth Brigade operations. The Fifth Brigade also engaged in the widespread raping of Ndebele women. The killing of the victims in a bid to destroy evidence followed some of the rapes. The Ndebele perceived the rapes as an orchestrated systematic attempt to create a generation of Shona children in Matebeleland as well as part and parcel of “shonalization” of the region.

What the Fifth Brigade succeeded in doing was to add an ethnic dimension to the conflict of the early 1980s and to harden ethnic prejudice and to bolster a strong identification between ethnicity and political affiliation. The use of highly politicized military forces as the Fifth Brigade helped to alienate Matebeleland region from the state as well as from any positive relationship with the military. It engendered the perception of the military as a Shona dominated institution meant to intimidate and kill the Ndebele. The whole violence of the Fifth Brigade came to be perceived as state sanctioned. The civilian memories of this violence of the early 1980s overshadowed that of the liberation war in Matebeleland. The violence of the liberation war became perceived as purposeful compared to the arbitrary and ethnically motivated terror of the 1980s.

The perception in Matebeleland is that the Fifth Brigade brand of violence was not an aberration but part and parcel of a plan orchestrated by the ZANUPF’s leaders. The Fifth Brigade operations were thus crucial in amplifying both a political and an ethnic interpretation of violence. However, Matebeleland regional perception of civil-military relations makes strong distinction between the Fifth Brigade—easily identified not only by its behaviour but also by its distinctive red-barrettes—from other armies that operated in Matebeleland in the 1980s. But the operations of the Fifth Brigade more than any other post-colonial development impacted negatively on civil-military relations in Matebeleland and left a long-lasting legacy in the region.

Other Militaries and the Matebeleland Region

It was not only the Fifth Brigade that operated in Matebeleland in the 1980s and that spoiled the civil-military relations in the region. There were other militaries such as the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), Police Support Unit (PSU), ZNA, ZANUPF Youth Brigades, Para-troopers, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Police Internal Security Intelligence Unit (PISI) as well as the Dissidents and the South African backed “Super Zapu” bandits. These groups had their own fair share of the contribution to negative civil-military relations.

The ZNA and the Support Unit are perceived differently from the notorious Fifth Brigade. These military units are seen as largely focused on eliminating the banditry and the dissidents in Matebeleland. They were not seen as a threat to the people’s lives but as professional security organs that protected the people and property. It was also among these military units that one could find Ndebele speaking people who would enquire sincerely about the whereabouts of the bandits and the dissidents. The people of Matebeleland considered the use of Ndebele language as a confidence builder between the civilians and the military. However, within the ranks of the ZNA and the Support Unit, some took advantage of the lawlessness and the cover of the curfew to harass the civilians with some at times masquerading as bandits and dissidents, and demanding food.

The ZRP were said to be at a complex situation whereby their hands were tied. Even if they wanted to help the civilians they were perceived as helpless in the face of officially and state sanctioned violence. At times the police risked their own lives by seeking to protect the civilians from the Fifth Brigade. They at times warned the civilians of the impending violence or danger. However, some people who flocked to the police stations to seek protection complained of their helplessness and failure to protect life. The Fifth Brigade could even come to take people to kill from the presence of the police officers. This led some people to accuse the ZRP of colluding with the politically motivated military units rather than protecting the civilians. People lost confidence in the police force as an arm meant to protect them. As such the police were brushed with the same brush with those who violated civilian’s rights. The police are therefore not trusted as well.

The other notorious military units who spoiled the name of the military in Matebeleland were the CIO and the ZANUPF Youth Brigade. These are perceived in the same manner as the Fifth Brigade because they carried out a more targeted programme of political violence during and after the Fifth Brigade depredations. The CIO are remembered for orchestrating the detentions and disappearances of people, particularly ZAPU leaders, ex-ZIPRA combatants as well as civilians. The CIO sometimes moved together with the Fifth Brigade and orchestrated simultaneous night sweeps throughout Matebeleland in an effort to surprise and capture key ZAPU activists. The ZANUPF Youth Brigade is remembered as becoming particularly prominent agents of violence and intimidation towards the 1985 general elections. While the ZANUPF Youth Brigade was not a military force in the true sense of the word, its violence made them to be lumped together
with the military violence in the collective memory of Matebeleland region.

The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation in a report entitled, Breaking the Silence, came to see the conflict in Matebeleland in the 1980s as a two-pronged attack and as consisting of overlapping conflicts. The first was between the dissidents and the government defence units, which included the ZNA and the Support Unit. The second conflict involved government and party agencies such as Fifth Brigade, CIO, PISI, and ZANUPF Youth Brigade, against all those who were thought to support ZAPU and spoke Ndebele. This second conflict was carried out mainly against unarmed civilians. It was in this second conflict that gross human rights were violated, which compounded the plight of civilians who were once more caught in the middle of a problem not of their own creation.

PISI was another notorious group of military personnel that operated in Matebeleland. It was an elite and secretive division within the home affairs ministry. Its functions were similar to that of the CIO, and in addition to intelligence collection, PISI had powers of arrest. Initial this group was termed Zipolis but was not active until Enos Nkala became minister of home affairs in August 1985. The people of Matebeleland were sometimes not able to make differences between this group and the CIO. However, PISI had a reputation for being even more ruthless and brutal than CIO, and at times would arrest people in the guise of CIO. Both PISI and CIO operated as plainclothes security units. It became very easy for the public to confuse two the groups. PISI became notorious because it was used by Nkala as his own agency as the minister of home affairs. Nkala surprised many in Matebeleland by his intense hatred of the Ndebele and Joshua Nkomo despite the fact that he came from Matebeleland. When Nkala became home affairs minister he told the nation that:
We want to wipe out ZAPU leadership. You’ve only seen the warning lights.
We haven’t yet reached full blast…the murderous organization and its murderous
leadership must be hit so hard that it doesn’t feel obliged to do the things it has
been doing.

This statement launched the PISI into full operation in Matebeleland accompanied by mysterious disappearances of many civilians, particularly the ZAPU leadership which Nkala described as members of a murderous organization, which only needed to be liquidated.

The last group of the militaries that operated in Matebeleland in the early 1980s was the dissidents and the Super Zapu. The official thinking in Zimbabwe was that the people of Matebeleland supported the dissidents and were sympathetic to their cause. It was also believed that the dissidents were sponsored by ZAPU. However, the current accounts from both the civilians and the ex-dissidents prove otherwise. When the ZAPU leadership dissociated itself from the dissidents, the people of Matebeleland also followed suit. They were various types of dissidents operating in Matebeleland namely, the South African sponsored Super Zapu who intended to destabilize Zimbabwe and cause security panic on the part of the state, the genuine ex-ZIPRA combatants who did not agree with the Lancaster House Agreement and who saw it as a sell-out on the part of the Patriotic Front leadership, there were also ex-ZIPRA who had joined the ZNA and defected because of ill-treatment and threats to their lives, there were demobilized ex-ZIPRA combatants who became dissidents because of harassment by the Fifth Brigade, there were some ex-ZIPRA combatants who became dissidents because of the treatment that was given to their war time commanders and ZAPU leadership as well as Ndebele youth who took advantage of the situation to lead a life of banditry. These groups too engaged in acts of violence and spate of rape during their operations adding another dimension to the civil-military relations. The dissidents were perceived with anger because the people of Matebeleland saw them as the source of the violence of the government forces.
Taking Stock of Military Intervention in Civilian Operations in Matebeleland

The military intervention in police and civilian operations in Matebeleland in the early 1980s had devastating implications for civil-military relations. In the first place it inculcated an authoritarian interaction between the military and other structures of the state in Matebeleland, rendering such structures momentarily ineffective. The first structure to be adversely affected was that of the ministry of home affairs. Joshua Nkomo as the first African minister of home affairs was rendered useless and was often by-passed in the decisions pertaining to the internal affairs department. The military and the minister of defence usurped the police duties. In reality, however, while it is acknowledged that such institutions as the military are authoritarian by its very nature, current trends towards democratization demand that the military’s interaction with other structures of the state and civil society take a more democratic outlook.

At another level, the intervention of the military in civilian operations indicated beyond doubt the move by the Zimbabwean government away from the legitimate and democratic rule by the consent of the governed to the authoritarian rule by repressive and violent measures based on unquestioning compliance. This development did not only alienate the Matebeleland constituency, but also ushered in a wave of militarization of politics. This wave of militarization of politics continues to negatively affect democratic governance in Zimbabwe today. While the deployment of the Fifth Brigade and their notorious actions in the 1980s in Matebeleland are still fresh in the minds of many Zimbabweans, the turn of the century in Zimbabwe has witnessed yet another military intervention in politics in the form of the War Veterans and the so-called “Border Gezi Youth Brigade”, popularly known as the “Green Bombers”. These are recent developments that testify to the trend towards militarism in politics. As in the 1980s the intervention of the military as well as pseudo-military organs in the political arena has been accompanied by erosion of basic freedoms of association, speech, assembly as well as by torture and death of the civilians.

What must be emphasized is that the military is not trained or equipped to deal with civilian operations. Their use in such operations have opened up the possibility of them employing excessive force, which tends to undermine their image and credibility among the civilians. There is no wonder, therefore, that the results of the operations of the military in Matebeleland in the early 1980s was followed by disquieting allegations of assault, torture, rape, and killing of civilians as well as suspects under interrogation by the military. J. Cilliers pointed out that any practice that conflates the role of the police and the military runs the risk of encouraging clashes between the two groups and politicization and lowering of their professional standards, especially for the military. Indeed by their very nature and ethos, the police and the military are different institutions and must be treated as such by any government that cherishes democratic principles.

Zimbabwe has experienced the devastating effects of the politicization of the military in the form of the highly political stance taken by the armed forces prior to the presidential elections (March 9-10 2002) when the army chiefs declared in a public televised speech that they would never salute any one as president of Zimbabwe who had no liberation war credentials. This statement elicited profound indignation throughout Zimbabwe and even outside the borders of the country. The army was trying to determine the political pace of change in the country and was threatening to thwart the democratic chances of all those who had no recognizable liberation war credentials. This was indeed the highest level of the involvement of the military in the democratic process by attempting to choose for the people the political nature of the person to rule Zimbabwe.

In Zimbabwe, the political influence of civilian personalities in the military impinged negatively on their operations as well as on the civil-military relations. The prime minister, Robert Mugabe was fond of inflammatory political speeches as the commander-in–chief of the armed forces, which did not augur well with cordial civilian relations. For instance, in 1985 in a celebratory aftermath of the general elections Mugabe made broadcast in Shona in which he told his supporters to “go and uproot the weeds from your garden.” This was followed by spate of violence targeting every supporter of PFZAPU and every Ndebele. It was during this time that mobs of the ZANUPF Women’s League in a vengeful spirit took the violence to Harare where they destroyed houses of suspected PFZAPU supporters and killing two pregnant women. Mugabe had already legitimized the violence in Matebeleland in April 1983 when he said:
When men and women provide food for the dissidents, when we
get there we eradicate them. We don’t differentiate when we fight,
because we can’t tell who is a dissident and who is not.

Enos Nkala supported Mugabe by demonstrating the clearest example of the blurring of the differences between civilians and the dissidents in a statement made in February 1983 at a rally for civilians in Matebeleland South where he told them that if they continue supporting dissidents and ZAPU, “you shall die or be sent to prison.”

Another culprit in this irresponsible politics was the minister of state security, Emmerson Mnangagwa. At a rally in Matebeleland North in April 1983, Mnangagwa told a huge, forcibly assembled crowd of civilians that the army had come to Matebeleland like “fire, and in the process of cleansing the area of the dissident menace had also wiped out their supporters.” He went on to state in a parody of biblical scriptures that:
Blessed are they, who will follow the path of the government laws,
for their days on earth shall be increased. But woe unto those who
will choose the path of collaboration with dissidents for we will
certainly shorten their stay on earth.

The danger that lurked in these statements was not only that it encouraged the violence that had already claimed many civilian lives, but the recurrence of the use of “we” in the statements proved beyond doubt that the ZANUPF leadership including the prime minister was behind the near genocide that engulfed Matebeleland in the 1980s. The people of Matebeleland thus were not only alienated from the military that perpetrated the violence on the ground but also from the ruling party and the government that sanctioned the violence. Some people in Matebeleland talk of the period as impi kaMugabe lamaNdebele (Mugabe’s war against the Ndebele) to differentiate it from the liberation struggle.

It was indeed the use of the military by the ruling elite in a political power game that made the army to loose much of its credibility among the Ndebele. In Matebeleland the existing perception of the army is that it is a coercive arm not only of the state but also, more specifically of the ruling ZANUPF party. It is seen as a Shona dominated institution that uses Shona language as its official means of communication with the civilians. Some times the Ndebele who served in the army in the midst of the violence of the 1980s are seen as sell-outs who survived the violence by selling out their colleagues and tribes men and women. The other dominant perception is that the army is viewed as above the law and as an institution of violence and death. Many people interviewed emphasized that amasotsha ngiyawesaba ngoba ayabulala (I fear the soldiers because they kill).

This perception of the military is largely derived from the past violence of the military in Matebeleland. The violence of the 1980s is vividly remembered both in urban and rural areas. When asked what the soldiers did the people hastened to say basibulala mntanami (they killed us my son). The violence of the 1980s left an estimated twenty thousand civilian dead. As such the Matebeleland regional perception of the military is dominated by fear, mistrust, suspicion, alienation, exclusion and long lasting bitterness. Some people were even reluctant to talk about their relationship with the soldiers, pointing out that it opened old wounds. All the people who were interviewed never saw the military in positive term as necessary protectors of life and people’s general security. They preferred that the soldiers be restricted to their barracks waiting to fight external threats and wars. In Zimbabwe, the military itself has developed a subculture of relating to the civilians in intimidating manner. They know that the civilians fear them and they enjoy that relationship with the civilians. Very little effort has been made by the military to cultivate cordial relations with the civilians. It seems they see themselves as hired to maintain the regime in power rather than the generality of the Zimbabwean population. One young man simply said soldiers are simply not with the people, are with the ruling party.

In Matebeleland region, the negative civil-military relations have generated two contradictory political behaviours among the civilians in general. On the one hand, there is the fatalistic and helpless compliance with the government and the ruling party. This is derived from the excessive fear of the repetition of the terror of the 1980s. The elderly men and women in rural Matebeleland mainly manifest this political behaviour. Their common position is that asifuni ukubona esaku bonayo (we don’t want to see what we saw again). They are more than convinced that the only way to avoid the repetition of the tragedy of the 1980s is to vote for ZANPF, confirming beyond doubt that they associate that violence of the time not only with military but, also with the ruling party, hence they have learnt to play the tune of accepted politics in Zimbabwe. The ruling party is reaping positive political results from this excessive fear, and the politicians sometimes try to remind the people of Matebeleland of the violence of the 1980s if ever they tried to be too politically assertive. At the moment this strategy seems to be working very well in rural Matebeleland for the benefit of ZANUPF.

On the other hand, there are youth, urbanites and the educated in Matebeleland who have emerged beyond the fatalistic and apathetic politics of compliance and limbo induced by the violence of the 1980s. These have resolved to risk every thing and to join hands with other democratic national forces such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), to work to change the status quo dominated by fear of ZANUPF and threat of repetition of the tragedies of the 1980s. These are some of the legacies left behind by the violence of the 1980s and they continue to shape contemporary politics in Zimbabwe today.

The Failure to Restore Cordial Civil-Military Relations and the Quest for Accountability in Matebeleland

The Unity Accord of 22nd December 1987 signed between PFZAPU and ZANUPF was one of the major measures taken in an attempt to restore cordial relations and peace and security in Zimbabwe. The cordial relations were not only to be restored between the military and the civilians but also between the people of Matebeleland and the government and as well as between the two major political parties in the country.

However, the accord only succeeded in achieving the minimalist conditions for a broad based restoration of cordial relations between the people of Matebeleland and the military as well as the government in general. Tensions were only frozen rather than removed completely. On the positive side, one can cite the fact that military violence that had engulfed Matebeleland since 1983 came to an end as well as the dissident activities. Those who were detained like Dumiso Dabengwa and others in connection with the politics of the 1980s were released. However, modern studies of peace and security have shown that the absence of violence or conflict does not indicate that there is peace and security, worse still cordial relations in any society.

One of the major flaws of the Unity Accord is that it was not a product of a democratic process that included the mass of the people. The reality of the accord is that it was an imposition on the people by the political elite. As such it was part and parcel of the single wave of “top-down” and “authoritarian nation building” strategies of ZANUPF which have always sidelined the people. The second major flaw was that the accord was not underpinned by a comprehensive post-conflict peace-building package, which is always imperative and necessary for the enhancement of human security, confidence building and restoration of civil-military relations in war-torn societies.

The post-conflict peace-building package calls for at least a five dimensional approach. The accord met only the first part of political rebuilding based on a long lasting political settlement and the definition of a power-sharing arrangement between the erstwhile disputants. The accord succeeded in this area although it failed to take the masses on board. This was its fatal flow. The second dimension involves the social rebuilding that include revitalization of major social institutions such as education and health as well as genuine reintegration of war victims and ex-combatants back to the civilian society. This is closely linked to the issue of psychological rebuilding based on the premise that all communities that have survived the ravages of violence suffer from deep traumatization. On this area the accord failed dismally. The people of Matebeleland are still clamouring for a sincere apology that goes beyond president Mugabe’s half-hearted statements that the events were regrettable and must be forgotten. The people of Matebeleland also require a simple assurance that what happened in the 1980s would never be repeated. This has not been forth coming. Hence perpetual fear still pervades the people in the region. Another issue on which the accord failed the people of Matebeleland is that it did not provide for the compensation of those that fell victim to the so-called madness of the 1980s. Worse still the people of Matebeleland feel that the events has not been acknowledged as part of national history that must not be repeated in future.

The fourth dimension relates to judicial rebuilding involving the sincere investigation of war crimes based on the noble precept of making sure in future fundamental human rights would be protected. However, in Zimbabwe following the signing of the accord both the dissidents and the Fifth Brigade were granted amnesty and pardoned without taking into account the feelings of those who lost their loved ones and who still suffer from the injuries sustained during the violence of the 1980s. In other words, the courts were denied their fundamental role in peace building through dispensing even handed justice to all citizens including the military. The use of indemnity clauses inherited from the Smith regime have also contributed to the protection of the military from the due course of the law as well as their failure to account for their past and present actions.

The last dimension is that of economic rebuilding that involves the replacement of destroyed homes and assets. During the operations of the military in Matebeleland in the 1980s civilians lost their homes through torching by the military as well as civilian supporters of ZANUPF as well as goods. Some people lost their jobs as they went on hiding due to threats to their lives. All these issue were not taken into account by the signatories of the Unity Accord in 1987. The quest for compensation by the people is not just being vengeful because if one visits areas in Kezi in Matebeleland South and Tsholotsho in Matebeleland North, the signs of military destruction of civilian homes and property are still poignant. Today the people of Matebelealand region continue to complain of marginalization and this complaint is casually linked to the political tragedies of the 1980s. Perhaps an affirmative action in development of the region can be the answer.

At the present moment the ruling ZANUPF party is frantically trying to lure the people of Matebeleland back to the political fold using the appeals of this flawed Unity Accord as well as the legacy left behind by the late vice-president, Joshua Nkomo. These efforts are not succeeding much because they are premised on a largely “empty” unity that did not benefit the people of Matebeleland in material terms.

What the people of Matebeleland have suggested as the way forward in the restoration of durable cordial civil-military relations include, the demobilization of all those who are known for perpetrating terror and violence in the 1980s from the army. They see this as the other way of indicating that the violence will never be repeated. The second common suggestion is that the recruitment to the military must reflect the ethnic composition of the country so as to remove the perception that the army is a Shona institution there to intimidate the Ndebele. The people interviewed also complained about the use of Shona language by the military even in the midst of Matebeleland. They preferred the deployment of military units for security and peacekeeping purposes who are able to communicate with the people in their local language. This was presented as a necessary confidence building measure. Some people expressed their displeasure at the politicians who tend to politicize the military for their own selfish ends. The other suggestion was that the army must be actively involved in civil and community services such as the construction of the long waited Zambezi Water Pipeline for it to be accepted by the people as part of them. The public relations organ of the military must engage in education campaigns in an effort to restore cordial civil-military relations and to destroy the bad perception of the army as an institution of violence, intimidation and death. Finally, it came out from the civilian accounts that they prefer internal security to be left to the police.

Conclusion

Oral evidence gathered from the Ndebele bears testimony to the persistence of a hidden but deep-rooted fear, anger and distrust the perpetrators of the violence. What can be said is that until Zimbabweans are delivered from the pervasive fear of their police, their army, their governments and their leaders, there will never be cordial relations, peace and security in the country. The way forward lies in the acknowledgement of the fact that a wrong was done and a sincere apology so as to build a trust in the people of Matabeleland that such a breach of the people’s human rights will never be repeated. Such an acknowledgement and assurance would definitely restore cordial civil-military relations in Matebeleland region.

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