ABOUT INDONSAKUSA

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AUTHOR INSTRUCTIONS

Muthwa Ncube - 15 December 2003

The fact remains that the present government of Zimbabwe is not a democratically elected one and therefore cannot be said to have the mandate of the people. That the 2000 parliamentary and the 2002 presidential elections were rigged is well documented and beyond dispute, despite what South African observers would have us believe - that they were free and fair. Add to this the fact that Robert Mugabe and his governments since 1980, have never been accepted in Matabeleland, a fact which highlights the precariousness of Ndebele-Shona relations in Zimbabwe.

Judging by Thabo Mbeki’s stance on Zimbabwe, his so-called “quiet diplomacy,” it is clear that he is being blinded by the misplaced, vacuous ideal of ‘African comradeship.’ Yet, he could, if he wanted, truly give meaning to the concept of an African Renaissance and NEPAD, by applying the spirit and letter of the law of both these programs. Suddenly, the charge that Thabo Mbeki is sacrificing democratic ideals in South Africa as well as Africa in general, for short-term political and economic gain doesn’t seem difficult to believe.

The ANC and especially Thabo Mbeki, need to be reminded that under Robert Mugabe, no sanctuary was offered in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1994 for Umkhonto WeSizwe cadres. During that time Thabo Mbeki was imprisoned by Robert Mugabe for reasons best known to Zanu PF and State Security, despite the fact that Zimbabwe was a member of the OAU, and in theory was committed to the struggle for the liberation of South Africa. It was then that the Guardian wrote:

“Mr Mugabe has pragmatically and consistently refused sanctuary to anti-apartheid guerrillas. Suspicion that Pretoria was encouraging and arming “dissidents’ in Matabeleland, against whom Zimbabwe’s Fifth Brigade is still deployed, have frequently been voiced but never fully substantiated. The basis of South Africa’s offers of accords with her other neighbours – Mozambique, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho – has been in essence the same; if the other party stops harbouring anti-apartheid guerrillas, Pretoria will cease to destabilise it directly by raids or indirectly by supporting rebels. If South Africa now sees a lever in the Matabeleland troubles, it is either ineptly revealing its hitherto hidden hand in the crisis or else overestimating its importance” (See, “Mugabe Blows His Top”, The Guardian, Wednesday 18 April 1984).

Hence, ideologically, historically and militarily, the ANC, prior to South Africa’s independence in 1994, had never had any links with Zanu PF and the Shona people of Zimbabwe. In 1965 the ANC formed an alliance with the Joshua Nkomo led ZAPU and its armed wing ZIPRA while Robert Mugabe’s Zanu PF sought and formed an alliance with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The ZAPU-ANC alliance had both political and regional significance, reflecting, as it did, historical Zulu/Xhosa/Ndebele homogeneity. Both the ANC and ZAPU parties had strong links with the former Soviet Union upon whom they relied for the bulk of their military requirements. Robert Mugabe saw the ANC-ZAPU alliance as a threat to his Shona kinsmen, who were all too well aware of how the King Mzilikazi established the Ndebele kingdom in South Western Zimbabwe. Thus, Zanu PF sought to remove this perceived threat by the Ndebele and laid the groundwork for the genocide that was to be visited upon Matabeleland in the 1980s. Upwards of 20,000 Ndebele people were slaughtered by Robert Mugabe’s ethnic army.

When the late Martin Thembisile (Chris) Hani was sent to the Soviet Union for military training, he returned in 1967 to take an active role in the liberation war of Rhodesia, acting as a Political Commissar in the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). ZIPRA, was under the command of Joshua Nkomo and operated out of Zambia. Hani was present for three battles during the 'Wankie Campaign' (fought in the Wankie Game Reserve against Rhodesian forces) as part of the Luthuli Detachment of combined ANC’s Umkhonto WeSizwe and ZAPU’s Zipra forces. Writing about the Wankie/Sipolilo operation, Chris Hani mentioned “the need for us to forge an understanding between the forces of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the forces of ZAPU and to understand the historical necessity of the battles of Wankie.” He also wrote that “the spirit of cohesion and unity between ourselves and ZAPU was magnificent. We were working together as one unit, consulting and discussing together. There was no friction whatsoever within this unit.”

The campaign provided much-needed propaganda for the struggle in Rhodesia and South Africa. During this campaign the local population of Matabeleland were harassed by the Rhodesian and South African Defence forces and pressurised to inform on guerrilla groups to the police. Of the general population, Hani wrote; “But in all fairness when we established this contact (with the population) we were met with enthusiasm by the people. We were given water and even fresh supplies of food. This was very useful and enabled us to continue for a few days marching towards the South of Zimbabwe.”[1]

Although Zapu has since been unified with Zanu (PF) and there are now former Zapu stalwarts within Zanu (PF), the unified party has been persistently rejected by the people of Matabeleland in an emphatic rejection of the so-called “Unity Accord.” It is an accord that lacks legitimacy because it was forced upon the people of Matabeleland, and whose sole purpose was to entrench Shona domination over the Ndebele. Moreover the ANC government needs to look into the circumstances which brought about this unification. Genocide was committed by Robert Mugabe against fellow black Africans.

The Ndebele element within present day Zanu (PF) which includes the likes of Dumiso Dabengwa has continued to fail to deliver on behalf of the Ndebele people and Matabeleland. The stalled Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project bears testimony to this. Although Zapu and Zanu (PF) were “unified”, this is certainly not the case at grassroot level.

Only Zanu (PF) and Robert Mugabe benefited from the Unity Accord of 1987. Former Zapu stalwarts, themselves under pressure from Robert Mugabe to toe the party line, have been pushed to the fore-front in dealings with the ANC government. It goes without saying therefore that the presence of the Ndebele and ZAPU element within Zanu (PF) has been exploited by Mugabe’s regime and used to extract a measure of respectability from Thabo Mbeki and the ANC.

It is about time Thabo Mbeki and the ANC realised that Robert Mugabe has got blood on his hands and cannot be trusted. He has not shown gratitude to South Africa and the rest of the SADC countries that continue to support him. In fact, Robert Mugabe continues to use various platforms to attack former colonialist Britain and the USA in the name of “neo-colonialism”. Given that South Africa also has land distribution inequalities that must be remedied if Zimbabwe-style invasions are to be avoided, one can understand Thabo Mbeki’s ambivalence towards Robert Mugabe. What is hard to understand is his seemingly misinformed reading of the politics in Zimbabwe.

In conclusion, Thabo Mbeki and the South African government should appreciate that the majority of the population of Ndebele people, half of whom now live in South Africa as political and economic refugees, thanks to the Mugabe regime, are principally divorced from Zanu (PF) and Robert Mugabe and that they expect South Africa to act resolutely against their tormentor. We expect the South African government is also aware of groups residing in Bulawayo, South Africa and abroad, representing of the people of Matabeleland and of their continued calls for self determination.

If all else fails, as a persecuted people, our right of self-government should be seriously considered. We expect South Africa to give us the same solidarity we gave them in their hour of need.

[1]Dawn: Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe, Souvenir Issue, 1986 – (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie.html)